



# JCISFA

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

Joint Staff | Army | Navy | Marines | Air Force

# JCISFA Quarterly

Issue 2, October 2016

## Inside this Issue

About JCISFA

Foreword

The Importance of SFA, Getting  
Beyond the Trigger Pulling

JCISFA Engagements

Observations on SFA in Africa

JCISFA Online SFA Courses

Registering for an Account

JCISFA Weekly Notifications

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# JCISFA

**Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance**

**Joint Staff | Army | Navy | Marines | Air Force**

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## In this Issue

About JCISFA .....	2
Foreword .....	3
The Importance of SFA, Getting Beyond the Trigger Pulling .....	4
JCISFA Engagements .....	6
Observations on SFA in Africa .....	8
• Lessons Learned in Training African Militaries.....	8
• JCOA Study on Defense Institution Building (AFRICOM).....	8
• Strengthening Defense Institutions in Africa .....	8
• Guidelines for DIB in Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017 .....	9
• Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Special Study - Center for Army Lessons Learned .....	9
• Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Observation Report .....	9
JCISFA Online SFA Courses.....	10
Registering for an Account .....	11
Subscribing to JCISFA Weekly Notifications .....	12

## About JCISFA

JCISFA is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) controlled activity (CCA) that reports to the Joint Staff J7, Joint Force Development.

JCISFA supports the integration of Security Force Assistance (SFA) capabilities into the current and future Joint Force in order to advance joint warfighting capability, through our two Mission Essential Tasks:

1. Develop and Integrate SFA Capabilities
2. Support SFA Strategy, Policy, Planning and Current Operations

### Acknowledgements

Cover Photo Credit:

International Partnership Inaugurates Amani Peace Operations Training Village

U.S. Army Major General Rob Baker, left, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa commander, congratulates a Kenyan Defense Force member on the success of the demonstration performed during the inauguration ceremony for the Amani Peace Operations Training Village held at the International Peace Support Training Centre August 8. The ceremony recognized the completion of phase four of the training village that simulates a typical peacekeeping environment in order to enhance efficiency and provide practical tactical skills while supporting peace missions.

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The purpose of this newsletter is to provide a quarterly publication to inform the SFA community of Interest (COI) of JCISFA's efforts, to serve as a platform to highlight the greater COI efforts, and to foster interoperability within the COI. Sharing JCISFA's efforts will help inform the COI of the myriad of ways JCISFA can be leveraged.

In addition to the JCISFA web portal, this newsletter serves as a forum for the COI to submit Observations and Recommendations or other articles of interest regarding their respective SFA efforts. As a service to the Joint Force, this newsletter intends to promote dialogue among the SFA COI that finds itself dispersed across various countries, and a myriad of Interagency, Joint & Service organizations.



# Foreword

We would like to thank those who provided feedback on the inaugural edition of our quarterly "JCISFA Connection" newsletter. Like any new effort, we are seeking to develop a useful and integrative newsletter that fosters dialogue and interoperability within the SFA community of interest (COI). As you will see, the second edition has undergone some modifications and we will continue to refine the product based on comments from the COI. Since our last issue, JCISFA has developed two online JKO training opportunities for the SFA COI. These two classes are part of JCISFA's ongoing distance learning effort to develop SFA capability across the Joint Force.

In this edition, JCISFA highlights the challenges of developing sustainable, institutional capability to support SFA activities at the operational level. Too often, the focus of SFA activities is the conduct of tactical level engagements with little to no regard in developing the Executive and Generating Functions required to develop and sustain the capability of partners and allies. JCISFA's EGO (Executive, Generating, Operating Functions) and OTERA (Organize, Train, Equip, Re-build, Advise) planning construct seeks to bring about a paradigm shift by providing a uniform lexicon that addresses SFA activities. This revised SFA lexicon is incorporated into Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13 and will be published in Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, "Security Cooperation," expected to be released this fall (we will highlight JP 3-20 in the next edition).

The challenges described above exist wherever SFA activities occur, but are particularly prevalent in AFRICOM. This newsletter focuses on recent engagements between JCISFA and the AFRICOM staff. The engagements represent SFA capabilities that JCISFA can bring to the table in support of GCCs along with AFRICOM specific Observations and Recommendations to help inform planners in their efforts.

In closing, this newsletter intends to promote dialogue among the SFA COI and is part of an ongoing effort to more effectively "Communicate, Cooperate, and Coordinate" across the Joint Force with all the SFA stakeholders. Please let us know if there are any particular SFA topics that you would like to see in future newsletters.

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# The Importance of SFA, Getting Beyond the Trigger Pulling

In June, JCISFA posed a question to the community asking whether SFA was important. The short answer of course was that SFA is of prime importance. However, implementation requires a cohesive planning view of the SFA effort from beginning to end. SFA planning must include both a comprehensive “Whole of Government” approach and a focus that goes beyond the Operating Function (of the EGO construct). This includes substantive development of the supporting and supported efforts within the Executive and Generating Functions that sustain the Operating Function SFA activities.

The EGO (Executive Function, Generating Function, and Operating Function) construct is a systematic approach that favors disciplined planning in SFA scenarios. The construct compels planners to consider the various levels of SFA planning and ensures plans are nested together in a supporting and supported relationship. As previously noted, SFA is important because the U.S. has finite resources. While many developed nations need only limited SFA effort from the U.S., less developed countries require increased assistance due to the growing violent extremist organizations that threaten regional stability on a neighboring continent and pose a possible threat of expansion to the U.S. homeland. The U.S. military is constrained by decreasing force structure levels and does not have the ability to provide sufficient presence in all the areas SFA may be required. Before an SFA plan is executed, the SFA construct of EGO should be used to ensure the generating function of training tactical forces is not the only consideration.

As an example, consider the U.S. government providing security or ensuring Nation X has the capability to provide security for itself. To do this, the U.S. could utilize U.S. “train & equip” funds to train soldiers to fire weapons and conduct missions. Using backwards planning, however, we see difficulties in how to get the partner nation to sustain the soldiers’ training. These challenges could include developing recruiters to find potential soldiers, “drill” and infantry instructors to train soldiers, and

supporting staff at training centers. The tactical training and employment of units or soldiers, can be considered part of the Operating Function, of the EGO construct. Challenges at the Generating function, or the Nation X service-level, include the organization, training, doctrine, or professional development that will guide recruit trainers. Additionally, the Nation X Ministry of Defense must ensure there is an operational process or organization that can provide feedback on whether the concepts taught in the schools actually support the operational mission or should be modified. Finally, at the Executive Function, significant attention must be focused on how government policy regarding strategic military posture is translated to the Generating Function. Specifically, when Nation X states the need for security, what does that mean and how should government resources be aligned to support the greater security mission beginning with the soldier trained to fire a weapon. Ultimately, this drawn out discussion typifies the SFA challenges when it comes to planning to employ a single soldier to fire a weapon. This fundamental analysis becomes exponentially more complex when Nation X is expected to create a supporting structure and combined arms structure to support multiple units that began with that soldier. Looking toward U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), we see a Geographic Combatant Command that considers SFA as its decisive effort.

## The Hard Sell of SFA in AFRICOM, but An Imperative Bill to Pay

On July 18, 2016, General Thomas D. Waldhauser, took over the reins of U.S. AFRICOM from retiring General David M. Rodriguez. The AFRICOM mission requires working in concert with interagency and international partners, to build defense capabilities, respond to crises, and deter and defeat transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.

AFRICOM relies on security cooperation and security force

assistance to build partner nation capability and capacity and strengthen this societal fabric. Unlike Western nations where a robust SFA effort may not be required, many African nations need more significant SFA activities that address advise and assist at the tactical military level. The key for AFRICOM is to identify vital SFA requirements and solution sets that interagency government elements need to cohesively address a Whole of Government approach.

During his confirmation hearing on 21 Jun 2016, General Waldhauser listed three goals:

*a) AFRICOM must continue to work with national and international partners to disrupt these transnational threats and prevent the export of terror on the continent, in the region, and ultimately to our homeland.*

*b) AFRICOM must continue to work with African partners to create an environment where these partners are willing and capable to address their security concerns.*

*c) [He] will work with not only the U.S. military components of AFRICOM, but with [his] fellow combatant commanders, as well, in order to foster an environment where our challenges are viewed from a transregional perspective and not just from a particular geographic area of responsibility.*

AFRICOM operates as an economy of force and must develop not only the military structure of the partner nations, but also a functioning governmental structure to maintain the military. General Waldhauser understands the national security interest is neutralizing transnational threats, such as Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, and AQIM not only to ensure they are unable to gain a lasting foothold in Africa, but also to ensure they do not affect other U.S. interests in neighboring regions or in the U.S. homeland. Due to an uncertain budgetary operating environment, a U.S. military response cannot be the sole answer to this threat. U.S. Security Force Assistance activities enable smaller organized U.S. Forces to build the capability and capacity of partner nation security forces. However, the question remains, how much SFA and where do you put it? With that said, even with smaller U.S. advisor forces, the vast expanse of the African continent cannot be covered, therefore an interagency approach to strategic planning must be devised.

During General Waldhauser's confirmation hearing,

Senator John McCain noted perceived failures in Libya and plied the general on whether there was a grand strategy for Libya or whether we would maintain the current response of incrementalism and mission creep. Senator McCain's concern, "Do we have a strategy for Libya, or are we just acting in an ad hoc fashion?" suggests congressional concern on how efficiently U.S. funds are being spent to achieve finite goals. The direct SFA implication is that while we can send U.S. troops to train partner nation militaries or possibly assist in the defense, a more structured interagency response is required to achieve a long standing solution that strengthens the partner nation government.

Furthermore, review of the current draft of the National Defense Authorization Act suggests a growing frustration in Congress on connecting funds with results. This is evidenced by language where Congress reminds the Department of Defense of the President's "whole of government" approach to security sector assistance planning in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) -23 and begins to develop on its own volition, a process to ensure the DoD workforce is better developed to conduct security cooperation.

Seemingly echoing the SFA EGO model advocated by JCISFA and included in the forthcoming Joint Publication 3-20, General Waldhauser squarely addressed the need to review an SFA solution that extends beyond training partner nation soldiers at the tactical level.

*I think it's important, when we talk about mil-to-mil training, to think about it in terms of three levels. The tactical training probably is the easiest, so to speak -- how to shoot a weapon, how to conduct a patrol, how to issue an order. We can do that, and we can do that well. Moreover, our partners can do that, and do that well. Where we, as the United States, and where we, as the U.S. military, can make significant differences is at -- what I would call at the executive or operational level. So, for example, take a service-level headquarters, those who would train, organize, and equip, and budget for forces are all part of this military training. Then, thirdly, I would say that, at the highly executive level, call it the OSD Secretary of Defense level, we need to make sure that government understands what their role is, and how that military supports the government.*

*So, it's really three levels. It's the tactical level,*

*which is the one that we all tend to think about, and the one that we do very well, but we also have to consider those other two levels, because that's all part of building an army in these countries.*

As General Waldhauser noted in his testimony, military efforts with the partner nation is not the sole SFA consideration. Working with the Department of State and other U.S. agencies will ensure capability gaps are addressed that the U.S. military cannot adequately cover, and ensure high-level coordination occurs when working alongside third-party countries, such as China and Russia.

A deliberate application of the Executive Function of the EGO construct will enable AFRICOM planners to obtain greater coordination with U.S. interagency and other international partners to devise cohesive SFA solutions that will efficiently address the Operating Function needs, via Generating Function capability, with Executive level direction and resources. For this reason, the effective implementation of SFA is important. The next article highlights recent JCISFA engagements in support of SFA activities in the AFRICOM AOR.



Marine Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Marine Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser, Commander, U.S. Africa Command, hold a press conference following the AFRICOM change of command ceremony at U.S. Army Garrison Stuttgart, Germany, July 18, 2016. Waldhauser assumed command from Army Gen. David M. Rodriguez, who will retire after 40 years of military service. Waldhauser is the first Marine AFRICOM commander and the fourth commander overall. DoD Photo by Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Dominique A. Pineiro

## JCISFA Engagements

### **Horn of Africa (HOA) Wargame Exercise Flintlock 2016**

CJTF HOA conducted an SFA wargame from 22-24 August 2016. This wargame represented a CJTF-HOA effort to ensure they had the resources and authorities to assist the development of the Somali National Army. As part of this exercise, the attendees were split into several groups representing governmental, non-governmental, and adversarial groups to study various SFA-related issues. JCISFA led one of these groups and conducted briefings in the plenary session to include the briefing to CG CJTF-HOA, MG Sonntag and the US Ambassador to Somalia, Stephen M. Schwartz on the final day. JCISFA was able to share observations and recommendations on how to create efficiencies in DoD and DoS planning and better align political and doctrinal modeling applied to Somalia.

Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) conducted Exercise FLINTLOCK 16 in Senegal and Mauritania, Africa from 18-23 February 2016 where JCISFA deployed its Special Operations Analyst to support the exercise. Other governmental agencies included DoS, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The three-week long exercise included 12 Allied and European partner nations to help train with 13 African partner nations. Viewing the exercise through the EGO, SFA construct, the exercise focused on training at the Operating Function, however, the exercise touched upon the other functions of the Executive and Generating. For example, at the Operating Function, SOCAF focused on training and conducting mil-to-mil persistent engagements at or below the brigade level. At the Generating Function, members of the Senegalese Infantry Officer Basic Course were brought in to participate in the Joint Multinational Headquarters to give them experience

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operating with other African partner nations. Finally, at the Executive Function, a Senior Leader Seminar brought in U.S. ambassadors and military commanders to discuss interoperability and unity of effort. A key takeaway was to find better ways to support SOCAF in conducting assessments of the respective African nations with the finite amount of resources and personnel.

## JCISFA Director Visit to AFRICOM

The JCISFA Director conducted several engagements with key AFRICOM personnel in early FY16 to connect JCISFA resources with AFRICOM SFA planning efforts. Examples of such engagements:

-AFRICOM Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance Branch, ACJ58. Discussions on execution framework for Security Cooperation/Security Force Assistance. Talks focused on generic design and objectives, decision points, and assessment mechanisms. As part of the assessment mechanism discussion, other considered issues included ways to measure mission success, money expended, personnel trained and links to objectives in a manner that can be readily analyzed and shared among stakeholders. Processes of this type would ensure SFA programs and their subsequent execution are aligned with a partner nation's ability to sustain the success.

-AFRICOM J1/8 (Analysis and Assessment Branch). The main purpose of the engagement was to offer and solicit feedback on the JCISFA SFA Assessment Handbook, published last year as well as understand AFRICOM's SFA challenges/issues. This discussion was timely as AFRICOM was developing assessments for their recently approved Theater Campaign Plan. The engagement provided JCISFA with different ways to address assessments that deal with SFA programs and authorities, cohesive planning across the EGO/OTERA construct, and planning differences between deliberate versus crisis action models for SFA.

-Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF). The main purpose of the engagement was to determine the suitability of the SOCAF FLINTLOCK 16 Exercise for a JCISFA collection on best practices and observations in a SFA-focused exercise (addressed above). FLINTLOCK 16 is an AFRICOM exercise that is executed by SOCAF and generally includes participants from over 30 countries (currently 14 from AFRICA), observers from about 10 countries and Interagency partners (DoS, DoJ, DEA, FBI and USAID), with over 1,700 participants. JCISFA successfully supported this effort this past February.

AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan Lead Planner Engagement. As SFA is considered the decisive effort of the AFRICOM TCP, JCISFA is uniquely positioned to

provide planning guidance and support to the planning staff. Based upon its connections, JCISFA was able to provide guidance based upon discussions with the DASD-SC office. JCISFA shared useful information with regards to SFA content in upcoming JP 3-20 and consideration for Generating Function/Institution-level Advising efforts. These talks created interest in developing a Generating Function / Institutional-level Advising Assessment effort to determine the appropriate requirements.

## DIB Training at AFRICOM HQs

In conjunction with AFRICOM J7 & J5 and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), JCISFA supported two iterations of the AFRICOM Defense Institution Building (DIB) Program Design and Implementation Training at AFRICOM HQs. The training included strategists, planners, program managers and implementers at AFRICOM Headquarters, Component Commands and CJTF Horn of Africa (HOA). The course focused on the key knowledge and skills needed to design, manage, and execute programs that help host country counterparts and staffs develop solutions for institutional capacity gaps.



## Lessons Learned in Training

### African Militaries

Click [here](#) to read the entire O&R

This O&R captures an AFRICOM lessons learned perspective related to training African Militaries. These lessons cross the spectrum from training and Defense Institution Building (DIB) activities to implications to the Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) and/or respective Offices of Security Cooperation (OSC).

### CHALLENGES OF THE U.S. INTERAGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL SSR PROCESSES (Extracts)

As some SCOs can no doubt attest, the cross-cultural frustrations of working with American interagency partners and other organizations can often exceed the cross-cultural frustrations of working with our African partners. The American "footprint" is sometimes quite large in these countries, and navigating its barriers and complexities can generate considerable "Clausewitzian friction" or resistance to momentum.

## Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Study on Defense

Click [here](#) to read the entire O&R

This O&R captures the recent JCOA study on Defense Institution Building (DIB) in support of AFRICOM. The JCOA Study consists of the following individual reports:

- JCOA AFRICOM DIB Lessons Learned Report
- JCOA AFRICOM DIB Framework Report
- JCOA AFRICOM DIB Vignettes Report

Defense Institution Building Framework Abstract: U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) requested JCOA study DIB and provide three products: a lessons learned and best practices document, a set of vignettes, and this report—a survey of DIB planning frameworks. The purpose of this

effort is to provide AFRICOM an analysis of existing Security Sector Assistance (SSA) related frameworks and a general recommendation as to how these frameworks may fit into the AFRICOM planning, execution, and assessment cycles. To accomplish this, JCOA used criteria derived from AFRICOM's request and the insights gained from the broader study effort, to assess more than twenty existing frameworks, narrow those down to nine for general use and three for use with specific partners. This report provides a potential approach for using the frameworks and an annex that contains a brief description of, and a checklist for, each of the applicable frameworks.

## Strengthening Defense

### Institutions in Africa

Click [here](#) to read the entire O&R

This O&R captures an information briefing provided by RADM Kovacich, AFRICOM J5 and select AFRICOM SC staff at the recent DASD-SC hosted DIB Col WG.

Agenda:

- Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) Embraces DIB
- Case Study – Counter Terrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF)
- Programmatic Constraints
- Leveraging Multinationals

Theater Campaign Plan (TCP):

- DIB encompassed by SFA
- SFA = USAFRICOM Decisive Effort / Way
- Need to balance ED, GF, OF

DIB Programmatic Constraints:

- Using one year funds to execute a multi-year program.
- Pulling existing, disparate authorities together to achieve net effect.
- Lack of an established Monitoring and Evaluation framework.
- Engaging State and other interagency partners.
- Limited OSC personnel and scheduling.
- Partner buy-in.

## Guidelines for DIB in Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017

Click [here](#) to read the entire O&R

This O&R captures DIB guidance for FY 2016 – 2017.

The Department will pursue Defense Institution Building (DIB) activities in accordance with the following guidance during FY16 and FY17. This guidance shall apply to DIB programs conducted by the Wales Initiative Fund (WIF), Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), the Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) Program, and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS). This should also inform the prioritization and coordination of activities related to partner defense institutions conducted by DoD Regional Centers, planned by Security Cooperation Officers, and implemented by DoD Components (to include the Military Departments).

## CJTF HoA (Special Study - Center for Army Lessons Learned)

Click [here](#) to read the entire O&R

This O&R captures the U.S. Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) special study on the Combine Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) titled "From Crisis Action to Campaigning." Specifically, this O&R archives the special study for historical purposes and provides analytical notes related to Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Force Assistance (SFA).

Purpose of Special Study:

"...this special study examines a significant shift in CJTF-HoA's focus: the transition from a short-term crisis, action-focused organization to a long-term campaigning headquarters..."

Chapter 1: History of CJTF-HoA Chapter

Chapter 2: The Horn of Africa Supporting Plan to Theater Campaign Plan

Chapter 3: The Effects Tasking Order Process as Non-

Kinetic Targeting

Chapter 4: Decision Support Planning and Tools: Planning to Support Decision Making

Chapter 5: The East Africa Multinational Planning Group

Chapter 6: United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Line of Effort 1 Synchronization

## Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA) Observation Report

Click [here](#) to read the entire O&R

This O&R captures the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Observation Report for JTF-HoA in December 2014.

Background (Extract)

The mission of CJTF-HoA is as follows: "Through unified action with United States and international partners in East Africa, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa conducts Security Force Assistance, executes military engagement, provides force protection, and provides military support to regional counter violent extremist organization operations in order to support aligned regional efforts, ensure regional access and freedom of movement and protect United States interests. Be prepared to execute and/or provide support to crisis response and limited contingency operations in order to protect United States military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel, facilities, and interests."

Executive Summary: A CJTF provides the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) a unique and effective means to plan, conduct and assess security cooperation activities within the combined joint operations area (CJOA) and by extension within the region.

There are challenges with using a CJTF to conduct Phase 0 shaping operations in support of the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP) to include maintaining competency and continuity with a rotational staff. This report provides observations and lessons that address how the Commander, CJTF-HoA executes mission command, the impetus for reorganizing the CJTF headquarters and the impacts this reorganization has had on planning, coordinating and executing assigned missions.

## JCISFA Online Courses

JCISFA has two new SFA courses available online through JKO. Click on the course titles below to launch.

[Security Force Assistance 101 \(1 hr\)](#) J30 P-US1336

This course introduces the learner to Security Force Assistance (SFA). Topics covered include SFA goals, SFA imperatives, and the role, traits, and skills of the Security Force Assistance Advisor.

Course Introduction UNCLASSIFIED

### Introduction

This course is designed for all advisors functioning in the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment.

Advisors may not necessarily come from the Department of Defense (DoD); therefore, this course is applicable to every individual filling the role of an advisor.



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RESOURCES GLOSSARY TRANSCRIPT

BACK 3 - 12 NEXT

[SFA 201 Building Partner Security Capacity \(1 hr\)](#) J30 P-US1335

This course discusses the elements of building and maintaining partner security capacity. Executive, Generating, and Operating functions basics are covered, as well as Ends, Ways, and Means.

# COURSE OBJECTIVES

UPON COMPLETION OF THIS COURSE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO:

- Define Security Force Assistance (SFA)
- Identify the functions of a security force
- Identify three types of foreign partner capabilities
- Identify the goals of a foreign security force

Select the Next Lesson tab at the top of the page to continue >

HELP RESOURCES GLOSSARY REWIND BACK 2/2 NEXT UNCLASSIFIED

## Registering for an Account

Did you know that any government employee can register for an account on the JCISFA portal? While we are primarily a military organization, we do have members who are from the State Department, the Department of Justice, the Coast Guard, Homeland Security and many more. Non-government employees with a government sponsor may also be granted access.

To register for an account please follow the following directions:

1. Click [here](#) to register on NIPR. To register on SIPR, go to <https://jcisfa.js.smil.mil>.
2. Please choose your authentication type. (You may choose either a government issued smart card or a username/password.\*)
3. Please fill out the required contact information for

your profile. This information allows us to properly categorize you in the system. (The system will recommend items based on your categorization and preferences.)

4. Click continue/save (one click). At this point the site will create an account for you.
5. Once you click save, you will be granted the opportunity to create a username/password or register your CAC.

After you have registered, JCISFA staff will review and approve your account. Please note that we have different rules for Contractors, foreign nationals and for non-government entities. Please refer to our [FAQ's section](#) on our site for more information.

\* The use of a username/password will prevent you from accessing For Official Use Only (FOUO) items on our site.


## JCISFA Weekly Notification

JCISFA publishes a weekly notification on NIPR, designed as a means to alert our subscribers to new Observations & Recommendations (O&Rs) posted to the JCISFA Website Portal.

These O&Rs cover a variety of topics related to Security Force Assistance. The system can automatically mail these to you each week.

To subscribe to this notification, please do the following:

1. Login to the JCISFA site
2. Go to the 'My Profile' tab
3. Select the 'My Subscriptions' tab
4. Click 'General Site Notifications' and 'Notify Me When Content is Published'





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## Knowledge Sharing

The JCISFA website portal pulls and publishes Observations and Recommendations (O&Rs) from PKSOI/SOLLIMS daily.

Additionally, O&R's from JCISFA are imported / exported to the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) daily.


## JCISFA Website Portal

The JCISFA Website Portal is our external presence online. We maintain both a NIPRnet (Unclassified/FOUO) site and a SIPRnet site.



NIPR site — <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil>

SIPR site — <https://jcisfa.js.smil.mil>



JCISFA's website portal provides a knowledge repository for SFA related Observations & Recommendations. Some of the key features of our site are its search and posting capabilities.

Members can search and find Published and Archived Observations & Recommendations (O&Rs). Releasability on O&R attachments varies, so please check prior to distributing.

Additionally, members can submit O&Rs based on their experiences in SFA. Submitted O&Rs are verified and published by JCISFA Staff.

To submit a Request for Information, please use the RFI button on our website or [click here](#). JCISFA will then contact you as soon as possible.

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